Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian Uncertainty: an Info-Gap Approach by Ben-Gad, M. et al.
Ben-Gad, M., Ben-Haim, Y. & Peled, D. (2015). Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian 
Uncertainty: an Info-Gap Approach (Report No. 15/09). London: Department of Economics, City 
University London. 
City Research Online
Original citation: Ben-Gad, M., Ben-Haim, Y. & Peled, D. (2015). Allocating Security Expenditures 
under Knightian Uncertainty: an Info-Gap Approach (Report No. 15/09). London: Department of 
Economics, City University London. 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/13920/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
  
 
Department of Economics 
 
Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian 
Uncertainty: an Info-Gap Approach 
 
 
Michael Ben-Gad1 
City University London  
 
Yakov Ben-Haim 
Faculty of Mechanical Engineering, Technion-Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa, Israel 
 
Dan Peled 
Department of Economics, University of Haifa, Israel 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
Discussion Paper Series 
No. 15/09 
  
 
1
 Corresponding author: Michael Ben-Gad, Department of Economics, City University London, Northampton Square, London EC1V 0HB, UK. 
Email: Michael.Ben-Gad.1@city.ac.uk 
 
 
Allocating Security Expenditures under Knightian Uncertainty:
an Info-Gap Approach∗
Michael Ben-Gad
a
Yakov Ben-Haim
b
Dan Peled
c
December 2015
Abstract
We apply the information gap approach to resource allocation under Knightian (non-
probabilistic) uncertainty in order to study how best to allocate public resources between
competing defense measures. We demonstrate that when determining the level and composi-
tion of defense spending in an environment of extreme uncertainty vis-a-vis the likelihood of
armed conflict and its outcomes, robust-satisficing expected utility will usually be preferable
to expected utility maximization. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in environments with
unreliable information about threats to national security and their consequences, a desire
for robustness to model misspecification in the decision making process will imply greater
expenditure on certain types of defense measures at the expense of others. Our results also
provide a positivist explanation of how governments seem to allocate security expenditures
in practice.
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“There are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say there
are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There
are things we do not know we don’t know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this
information together, and we then say well that’s basically what we see as the situation, that is
really only the known knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more
of those unknown unknowns.1
Donald Rumsfeld
Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
1 Introduction
What is the best procedure for a policy maker to employ when allocating scarce resources to
both deter military aggression, and in the event deterrence is unsuccessful, mitigate its effects,
if previous experience provides little relevant guidance? This paper demonstrates how both the
scope and nature of defense expenditure should change, if policy makers wish their decisions to
be robust to the type of Knightian (non-probablistic) uncertainty they ordinarily confront.
When allocating resources, policy makers, like households, face trade-offs. Many of the trade-
offs households encounter can reasonably be modeled in a deterministic setting—their incomes
may be uncertain, but when deciding between a new refrigerator or a new television set, we
generally assume that consumers know the marginal utility they will derive from each. By
contrast, policy makers often confront decisions in which the connection between allocations,
and the desirability of outcomes, are uncertain. Nonetheless they are often able to derive
reliable probabilistic models that link different allocations of funding with the moments of a
distribution of outcomes. For example, no one can predict precisely by how much a dollar
transferred between different components of the public health budget will affect an individual
citizen’s longevity. However, policy makers know a great deal about not only the prevalence,
but the distribution of infectious diseases, heart problems, and cancer for various population
groups and the efficacy of different treatments for large samples of patients.
Unlike public health decisions, allocating resources for national security involves decisions
where experiments are not possible (or at least unwise). Moreover, as relations between any set
of political actors on the international stage are constantly shifting, and both military doctrines
and technology continue to evolve, previous experience may not provide much useful information
upon which to base present-day decisions on how best to cope with future threats.2 The policy
1Antulio J. Echevaria II (2008).
2David Hume, writing in 1748: “What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?.....All experimental
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maker whose country is threatened by hostile forces may know little about the probability
distribution of possible damage or losses his country could suffer in the event of armed conflict,
as any estimate will require both an intimate knowledge of the adversary’s capabilities and
tactics, and the degree to which they might be counteracted by different defense allocations.
Indeed, the probability that an adversary will launch an attack may itself be unknown to the
policy maker, as it requires judgements about the intentions and expectations of foreign leaders,
or sub-state actors and yet is still dependent on the type of defense capabilities our policy maker
has chosen. Finally, often enough the enemy’s own political and military decision makers are
uncertain about their own goals or the best means to achieve them, at the time the our decision
maker must determine the best allocation.
When allocating resources for national defense, the maximization of expected utility will
often prove inadequate because it assumes that probability distributions are known, or at least
that statistical moments can be calculated. Required is a methodology that enables the policy
maker to allocate resources without requiring the use of unavailable probabilistic information.
By implementing the info-gap methodology, policy makers combine what they know about
security threats, and their relationships to installed military capabilities with specified policy
requirements, without requiring the policy maker to know how wrong the available information
is. Moreover, our analysis highlights one rationale for heightened spending on some types of
defense measures when there is little reliable information about the random nature of threats
to national security. This provides a possible positivist explanation for the way governments
allocate these expenditures today, and how they have done so in the past.
In section 2 we describe the general formulation of the info-gap methodology in the context
of defense expenditure. In section 3, by way of example, we consider a simple version of a
dilemma faced by many policy makers today: how much to spend overall on defense and how
much of that spending should be diverted towards the precision munitions, electronic warfare,
and space-based communications and intelligence necessary to implement the ‘Revolution in
Military Affairs’ (RMA) doctrine, and away from continued investment in large units employing
traditional industrial-age military technology and platforms.
conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past....why this experience
should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may be only in appearance
similar; this is the main question on which I insist....If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may
change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no
inference or conclusion.”
2First elaborated during the 1980’s by Soviet military theorists, in particular Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, then
chief of the Soviet General Staff, the RMA doctrine of war has already had a profound effect on Western military
planning. The move to adapt the U.S. military to RMA type warfare was spearheaded by the Department of
Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and the man who has headed it since 1973, Andrew Marshall, and the vice
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff between 1994 to 1996, Admiral William Owens. See Eliot A. Cohen (1996).
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Throughout this paper, the risk of being attacked and the probability distribution of damage
conditioned on an attack occurring—both of which are info-gap uncertain—are related to both
the size and structure of the military force policy makers have chosen. We demonstrate that
when policy makers must operate in an environment in which information about the relationship
between threats and different allocations for defense is unreliable, expected utility maximization
does not provide the best guidance for making decisions, because it is completely non-robust
to model misspecification. Using a hypothetical specification of security risks and the cost
effectiveness of alternative defense measures, we show that the desire of policy makers to attain
some degree of robustness to model misspecification, will have profound effects on both the
level of resources devoted to defense, and the distribution of these expenditures across the two
possible types of defense measures.
2 Formulation
Consider a country facing various threats to its national security. These threats can take various
forms, including invasion by an aggressive neighbor or a terrorist attack. Policy makers perceive
threats to security from all sources as a bivariate distribution that includes both the event of
being attacked, and the damage the country will sustain conditional on the attack taking place.
In contrast to standard stochastic optimization problems, the distribution itself is uncertain.
Policy makers must decide what portion of the economy’s resources they will devote to countering
security risks, as well as how to allocate this expenditure between different defense measures,
where each measure has a different effect on both the risk of an attack and the potential damage
it will inflict. In this paper, this defense resource allocation dilemma is embedded within a
standard economic framework in which the representative risk-averse individual in this country
derives utility u(c) only from consumption, c. The threats considered here, and the effect of
any countermeasures, affect the resulting level of utility through their influence on the resources
that remain for consumption, the likelihood of being attacked, and the conditional distribution
of losses an attack may inflict.
Normalizing the economy’s resources to 1, the policy maker must choose the fraction of
all resources to devote to each of N different risk-mitigating expenditures χ = (χ1, . . . , χN ).
Without government debt, we require
∑N
i χi ≤ 1. Any government expenditure detracts from
the resources available for consumption, so c = 1−
∑N
i χi. On the other hand these government
expenditures reduce the likelihood of an attack and the fractional loss ψ in resources resulting
from an attack if it takes place, where 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1.
The probability density function (pdf) of realized threats, conditioned on risk mitigating ex-
penditures, is p(ψ|χ)—a probability distribution unknown to policy makers. The best available
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estimate of p(ψ|χ) is denoted p˜(ψ|χ), but it is incontrovertible that p˜(ψ|χ) is highly unreliable.
We denote the probability of attack, as a function of defense spending χ, by Pw(χ), and the best
(but highly uncertain) estimate of this function is P˜w(χ). The salient feature of this function,
(illustrated in Figure 2 for N=2), is that P˜w(χ) is a decreasing function of each type of defense
expenditure, holding expenditures on other types fixed.
Let R(χ|p, Pw) be the expected utility resulting from defense expenditure χ, when the prob-
ability of the attack being realized is Pw, and the pdf of the damage ψ is p(ψ|χ):
R(χ|p, Pw) = Pw(χ)
∫ 1
0
u
[
(1− ψ)(1−
N∑
i
χi)
]
p(ψ|χ) dψ + (1− Pw(χ))u(1−
N∑
i
χi) (1)
where the last term, u(1 −
∑N
i χi), represents the level of utility agents in this economy enjoy
if no security risks materialize.
The info-gap model in the current context is an unbounded family of nested sets of prob-
ability models of p(ψ|χ) and Pw(χ), indexed by α, which represents the unknown horizon of
uncertainty in the policy maker’s best estimate of the chances of an attack occurring and of
the conditional distribution of the damages it would inflict. We denote this info-gap model by
F [α, p˜(ψ|χ), P˜w(χ)], where α ≥ 0.
3 The important feature of this info-gap model is that larger α
entails larger possible deviations of the actual distributions of threats from their best estimates,
and accordingly a wider range of actual challenges the defense allocation chosen will need to
confront. A specific illustration of the info-gap model will be presented in section 3.2.
The policy maker requires that the expected utility be no less than a critical value, Rc. This
critical value may be uncertain, or the policy maker may wish to identify an acceptable value
of Rc that can be confidently anticipated, given a proposed allocation χ. In other words, the
goal of the policy maker is to maximise robustness to model uncertainty subject to a minimally
acceptable expected utility. That is, the policy makers wishes to choose an allocation decision
χ that yields the widest margin of error in model specification under which the expected utility
equals or exceeds Rc.
Specifically, the robustness of allocation χ is the maximum horizon of uncertainty, α, up to
3Info-gap models obey two axioms:
(i) Nesting asserts that the range of possible pdfs increases as α increases:
α < α
′ =⇒ F [α, p˜, P˜w] ⊆ F [α
′
, p˜, P˜w] (2)
(ii) Contraction asserts that when α = 0, the best estimated models are the only possibilities:
F [0, p˜, P˜w] =
{
p˜, P˜w
}
(3)
These two axioms endow α with its meaning of a horizon of uncertainty.
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which the expected utility is no less than Rc for all probability functions in F(α):
α̂(Rc, χ) = max {α | R(χ|p, Pw) ≥ Rc, ∀ (p, Pw) ∈ F(α)} (4)
More robustness is better than less, so the robust-optimal allocation at the minimally ac-
ceptable reward Rc is the allocation that maximizes the robustness:
χ̂(Rc) = argmax
χ
α̂(Rc, χ) (5)
In summary, α̂(Rc, χ) is the robustness of allocation χ for achieving expected utility no less
than Rc. Likewise, α̂
∗(Rc) is the maximal robustness for achieving expected utility no less than
Rc by choosing the appropriate values of χ. It is the maximum value of α̂(Rc, χ) from (4),
evaluated at Rc and χ̂(Rc) from (5).
α̂∗(Rc) = max
χ
{α | R(χ|p, Pw) ≥ Rc, ∀ (p, Pw) ∈ F(α, p˜, P˜w)} (6)
As in any info-gap model (Ben-Haim, 2006), there is a fundamental trade-off between min-
imally acceptable reward and robustness to uncertainty: the former decreases as the latter
increases as will be demonstrated subsequently.
3 An Illustration with Two Types of Security
Expenditure
3.1 Basic Structure
By way of example, suppose all military expenditures fall into one of two broad categories. First,
there is the expenditure that incorporates recent innovations in military technology and tactics,
based on the intensive use of information technology, high-precision weaponry, and satellites
employed for both intelligence and command and control systems. We denote this type of
defense expenditure, associated with the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) doctrine, as
χ1. Second is the development and maintenance of large military formations, composed of large
numbers of troops receiving traditional military training to serve as infantrymen or to operate
armor, artillery, battleships and bombers. We denote this, the more traditional, industrial-
age type of military expenditure, and the one most closely associated with twentieth-century
warfare, as χ2. Both χ1 and χ2 are measured as shares of GDP, and we assume there is no
possibility of international borrowing. Recall that p(ψ|χ) is the probability density function
(pdf) of the damage the nation sustains in terms of lost GDP in the event that it is attacked,
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and assume its shape is influenced by both the overall quantity of resources devoted to security,
χ1+χ2, and also by how resources are divided between χ1 and χ2. Next we illustrate the kinds
of considerations which can be employed to set the shape of the probability models used in the
sequel.
With its reliance on small, highly mobile and specially trained military units, the RMA
doctrine can under the most optimal conditions limit the severity of casualties and other losses
for many kinds of attacks, but is more prone to catastrophic failure, particularly in the event
of a massive invasion by a large military force. Accordingly, we assume that holding the GDP
share of total defense expenditures fixed, the more defense expenditures are weighted towards
RMA type, at the expense of traditional weapons systems and military formations, the lower are
the expected losses conditioned on an attack occurring, but the risk of extremely high damages
increases. By contrast, traditional large military formations can insure against the most severe
and widespread losses, but reliance on them will entail higher losses under most circumstances.
With all defense expenditure restricted to fall into these two broad categories, policy makers’
best (but highly uncertain) estimate of the damage pdf, conditional on being attacked and given
allocation of defense expenditure χ1 and χ2, is p˜(ψ|χ1, χ2). Given the long planning horizon
necessary to prepare defense forces, the relevant unit of time in this model is a decade.
The functional form for the best estimate of the damage density function reflects all available
knowledge about possible losses incurred in the event of suffering an attack, and how the risks
of these losses relate to the values of χ1 and χ2. In the sequel we provide the specification of the
particular probability density function we chose for our illustration. Here, it suffices to note the
two most salient features implied by our specification, which capture the essence of the tradeoff
assumed to exist between the two alternative types of defense expenditure:
1. Mean damage generally declines in each of the security expenditure types. That is, at
least in the neighborhood of χ̂(Rc), we assume:
∂E(ψ)
∂χi
< 0, i ∈ {1, 2} (7)
2. At the same time, while holding total security expenditure fixed, we expect to observe that
increases in the share devoted to traditional security expenditures lowers the probability of
extreme damage, defined here as 60% of output. That is, we expect to generally observe:
∂Prob(ψ < 0.6)
∂χ2
∣∣∣∣
χ1+χ2
> 0 (8)
In Figure 1 we graphically present the density function p˜(ψ|χ), based on the specification in
the appendix. In that figure, total defense expenditures χ1+χ2 is set at a constant ten percent
of GDP, while the value of the traditional military expenditure χ2 varies between the values 0
and 0.1.
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These damage estimates are conditional on the occurrence of an attack, but what do we
know about its probability?4 Clearly, determining the probability of attack will necessitate
estimating the military capabilities of potential adversaries—capabilities they may varyingly
wish to conceal or exaggerate.5 More difficult still is the need to assess the intentions of foreign
leaders, whose decision processes and perceptions are often informed by cultures and historical
memories different from one’s own.
The assumption that all actors in the arena of world politics can be counted upon to
take a rational approach in foreign policy is not without some validity and utility; but
it does not offer a sufficient basis for estimating how these other actors view events,
calculate their options, and make their choices of action....To describe behavior as
“rational” is to say little more than that the actor attempts to choose a course of
action that he hopes or expects to further his values. But, of course, what the
opponent’s values are and how they will affect his policymaking and decisions in
different kinds of situations remains to be established. Moreover, foreign-policy
issues are typically complex in that they raise multiple values and interests that
cannot easily be reconciled. Even for the rational actor, therefore, choice is often
difficult because he faces a value trade-off problem. How the opponent will resolve
that dilemma is not easily foreseen, even by those close to him let alone by those
in another country who are attempting to predict his action on the basis of the
rationality of the assumption.6
Yet even if it were possible to understand a potential opponent’s existing intentions in a manner
sufficient to assign probabilities to an attack as a function of one’s own defense allocations, this
would still be insufficient. Intentions change.
Though the Japanese were not privy to German plans to attack the Soviet Union, during
the months before Operation Barborossa was launched on 22 June, 1941, the Japanese actively
considered beginning to prepare for a ‘northern war’, an attack on the Soviet Union’s far eastern
territories. Throughout that summer, civilians and military people in the Japanese government
weighed the various merits of attacking the Soviet Union, attacking the Western powers to the
4“As the ancient retiree from the Research Department of the British Foreign Office reputedly said, after
serving from 1903-50: ‘Year after year the worriers and fretters would come to me with awful predictions of the
outbreak of war. I denied it each time. I was only wrong twice.’” Thomas L. Hughes, 1976, p. 48.
5“An adversary can still decide to attack even though his capabilities are relatively weak (1) if he miscalculates
the strength of the intended victim (as did the Germans in their attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, or the Arab
States in their underestimation of Israeli capabilities in 1967); (2) if he is more interested in applying political
pressure or making political gains even at the cost of military defeat; (3) if he gambles that his surprise attack
will have a force multiplier effect sufficient to compensate for his inferior capabilities.” Handel, 1989, p. 241.
6Alexander George, 1980, p. 66.
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Figure 1: The best estimate of the probability density of damage, conditional on defense
expenditure p˜(ψ|χ) as in (26), for different values of χ2, traditional military expenditure,
where total defense spending comprising both RMA-type and traditional expenditure is
χ1 + χ2 = 0.1.
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south, or continuing to rely on diplomacy while consolidating gains in China and newly acquired
French Indo-China. Only at a military conference on 3 September did the more aggressive view
of the Japanese Army prevail over that of the more cautious Navy to initiate a war in the south,
in response to continuing United States refusal to restore normal economic relations and not
impede further Japanese ambitions in China. Three days later an imperial council approved the
military’s recommendation that “if, by the early part of October, there is still no prospect of
being able to attain our demands, we shall immediately decide to open hostilities against the
United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.”7 The decision to begin preparations for the
‘southern war’ commenced only three months and a day prior to the attack on 7 December, 1941.
Hence the probability of an attack over the course of a decade is subject to great uncertainty—
policy makers can scarcely quantify with much confidence the probability of an attack long
before an enemy might even be considering one. Figure 2 portrays the potential subtle influences
defense expenditures of both types can have on the probability that an attack will be launched.
3.2 A Fractional Info-Gap Model of Uncertainty
The density function p˜(ψ|χ) is the best estimate of the pdf of damage from an attack, given
security allocation χ = (χ1, χ2). However, this estimate is based on fragmentary and unreliable
evidence, and hence contains potentially serious but unidentifiable errors. The same is true for
the estimated probability of attack, P˜w(χ). The true values deviate from these estimates by
unknown amounts. We use a fractional error info-gap model to represent the gaps in both the
pdf of the damage and the probability of attack (Ben-Haim, 2006). Let P denote the set of all
pdfs on [0, 1]. For any α ≥ 0 our info-gap model consists of all density functions and probability
values that differ proportionally from p˜(ψ|χ) and P˜w(χ), respectively, by no more than α. That
is:
F(α, p˜, P˜w) =
{
(p(ψ), Pw) : p(ψ) ∈ P, |p(ψ)− p˜(ψ|χ)| ≤ αp˜(ψ|χ), for all ψ
0 ≤ Pw ≤ 1, |Pw − P˜w(χ)| ≤ αP˜w(χ), α ≥ 0
}
, (9)
The value of the fractional error α is unknown, so the info-gap model is not a single set,
but rather an unbounded family of nested sets of possible pdfs and probabilities. Since α is
unbounded from above, there is no known worst case.
3.3 Robustness Function
Conditioned on an attack occurring, the expected utility under the best estimates of damage
density is:
7Butow, 1961, p. 250.
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Figure 2: The best estimate of the probability of being attacked P˜w(χ) (as in (30)) for
different values of χ1 and χ2.
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r˜(χ) =
∫ 1
0
u [(1− ψ)(1− χ1 − χ2)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (10)
The unconditional expected utility, based on the best estimates of the damage pdf p˜(ψ|χ) and
the probability of attack P˜w(χ), (as defined in (1)) is:
R˜(χ) = P˜w(χ)r˜(χ) + (1− P˜w(χ))u(1− χ1 − χ2) (11)
We assume that r˜(χ) < u(1− χ1 − χ2), so that the expected utility in the event of an attack is
always smaller than it is in the absence of an attack. The expected utility for arbitrary p(ψ|χ)
and Pw is obtained from (1). The objective of the policymaker, for a given Rc, is to choose the
defense expenditures χˆ(Rc) for which attains an expected reward that does not fall below Rc
for the widest horizon of uncertainty.
In order to find the robust-optimal allocation we first need to express the robustness to model
uncertainty (α̂) as a function of the defense allocation. Full details of this representation are
provided in the Appendix. Intuitively, we do that by exploiting the assumption that marginal
utility is positive and decreasing in ex-post resources, and choose probability objects, to be
denoted by Pˆw and pˆ, which are ’worse’ than p˜(ψ|χ) and P˜w(χ), respectively, but differ from
these proportionally by no more than α%. Since an attack can only decrease expected welfare,
the probability of attack is taken to be:
Pˆw =
 (1 + α)P˜w if α < (1− P˜w)/P˜w1 else (12)
For the damage pdf, we distinguish between α ≤ 1, and α > 1. For the former we use:
pˆ(ψ|χ) =
 (1− α)p˜(ψ|χ) if ψ ≤ ψm(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (13)
where ψm is the median of the best estimate of the damage pdf p˜(ψ|χ). For α > 1 we use:
pˆ(ψ|χ) =
 0 if ψ ≤ ψs(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (14)
where ψs satisfies:
(1 + α)
∫ 1
ψs
p˜(ψ|χ) dψ = 1 (15)
In other words, ψs is the 1− 1/(1 + α) quantile of p˜(ψ|χ).
Next we define:
r˜1(χ) =
∫ ψm
0
u [(1− ψ)(1− χ1 − χ2)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (16)
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r˜2(χ) =
∫ 1
ψm
u [(1− ψ)(1− χ1 − χ2)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (17)
r˜(χ) = r˜1 + r˜2 (18)
δr(χ) = r˜1 − r˜2 (19)
c(χ) = 1− χ1 − χ2 (20)
Since marginal utility is positive and decreasing, r˜1 > r˜2 and p˜(ψ ≤ ψm)=p˜(ψ > ψm)=0.5.
Consequently, as we show in the Appendix, the smallest expected utility over F(α, p˜, P˜w), is
obtained with Pˆw and pˆ, is given by (33) and (34) for α ≤ 1 and α > 1, respectively. Equating
these terms to Rc, and solving these quadratic expressions for α yields the desired robustness
as a function of the defense allocation chosen. Suppressing the explicit dependence on χ, the
functional form of α̂ that corresponds to (13) is:
α̂(χ|Rc) =

(2r˜2−u(c))P˜w−
√
(2r˜2−u(c))
2
P˜ 2w+4δrP˜w
(
(r˜−u(c))P˜w+u(c)−Rc
)
2δrP˜w
if R˜(χ) ≥ Rc
0 else
, (21)
and the functional form of α̂ corresponding to (14) is:
α̂(χ|Rc) =

(2s˜2−u(c))P˜w+
√
(2s˜2−u(c))
2
P˜ 2w−4s˜2P˜w
(
(s˜2−u(c))P˜w+u(c)−Rc
)
−2s˜2P˜w
if R˜(χ) ≥ Rc
0 else
, (22)
where:
s˜2 =
∫ 1
ψs
u [(1− ψ)(1− χ1 − χ2)] p˜(ψ|χ) dψ (23)
The value of R˜ in (11) is expressed in terms of utility. In our economy the representative
individual has a maximum of a single unit of consumption, from which defense expenditures
and any damage to the economy are deducted. Define the allocation that maximizes expected
utility under the best estimates of an attack probability and damages pdf:
χ∗ ≡ argmax
χ
R˜
(
χ|p˜(·|χ), P˜w(χ)
)
. (24)
We use this allocation to generate a loss function in terms of a compensating consumption
differential q. For that purpose define L(q) to be the expected utility under p˜ and P˜w obtained
from defense allocation χ∗ when an amount q of consumption is lost in addition to
∑
i χ
∗
i :
L (q) = P˜w (χ
∗)
∫ 1
0
u ((1− ψ) (1− χ∗1 − χ
∗
2 − q)) p˜ (ψ|χ
∗) dψ +
(
1− P˜w (χ
∗)
)
u (1− χ∗1 − χ
∗
2 − q)
(25)
In the numerical results below, rather than choosing values of Rc or reporting the values of
R˜(χ) we choose to express losses in terms of the consumption equivalents. Hence the maximum
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acceptable losses are expressed in terms of the consumption equivalents qc, so that deviations
from maximized expected utility is qc = L
−1 (Rc) . In similar fashion, the expected utility
R˜(χ) associated with a particular defense allocation χ, expressed in consumption equivalences
is q˜ = L−1
(
R˜(χ)
)
, where L−1
(
R˜(χ∗)
)
= 0 by definition.
3.4 Historical Perspectives
In terms of the damage inflicted on society by war, Table 1 presents the direct expenses of major
U.S. wars along with U.S. fatalities. In proportion to the size of the economy, the heaviest direct
economic costs were incurred during World War II; however, in terms of loss of life relative to
the size of the population, the Civil War was far deadlier. Obviously the latter conflict, fought
entirely on American soil, generated the greatest loss of capital, damage to infrastructure and
disruption of output. In the aftermath of World War I, Bogart (1919) began developing the
tools to measure, compare, and aggregate all these different costs of war, by including not only
the direct costs in military expenditure as well as physical destruction, but the indirect costs
associated with the capitalized values of losses in life and lost production. According to his
calculations, the share of direct costs incurred by all the combatants of World War I amounted
to only 55% of the total losses the war generated.
Broadberry and Howlett (1998) calculate that the UK spent approximately half of its GDP
fighting World War II during the years 1940 to 1944. In addition it suffered losses of physical
capital that amounted to 89% of GDP in 1938 (see Mitchell, 1980), and human capital losses
(calculated conservatively in terms of just the schooling invested in those killed) of 2.5% of
GDP in 1938. By any measure Soviet losses were far higher. During 1942 and 1943 defense
expenditures in the Soviet Union reached 61% of GDP, losses of physical capital amounted to
223% of pre-war GDP and losses of human capital were 109% (Harrison, 1998). Of course
these figures do not include the extraordinary privations suffered by those living under German
occupation during much of this period. To study the cost of World War II for the United
States, Rockoff (1998) employs a counterfactual approach developed by Goldin and Lewis (1975)
to study the US Civil War. According to his estimates the total present value of foregone
consumption that can be attributed to both direct and indirect losses generated by the war
equals 2.27 years of consumption in 1941.8
8As most of its effects are indirect, the impact of terror is not as well understood. Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) estimate that terrorism in the Basque country of Northern Spain has reduced GDP by 10%. Similarly,
recent estimates of the loss in GDP that can be attributed to three years of recurring terrorism against Israel
is also approximately 10% (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004 and Persitz, 2005). Bram, Orr and Rapaport (2002)
estimate the total cost of one incident, the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center in New York,
including lost lifetime earnings of those killed, to be between $33 billion and $36 billion. What is clear is that
large-scale conventional warfare is far more costly than any losses associated with terror—Hess (2003) calculates
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Total Direct People Fatalities
Costs Mobilized
Conflict Billions Percent Percent Percent
of 2002$ of GDP Thousands of Pop. Numbers of Pop.
Revolutionary War
(1775 – 1783) 2.2 63% 200 5.70% 4,435 0.127%
War of 1812
(1812 – 1815) 1.1 13% 286 3.80% 2,260 0.030%
Mexican War
(1846 – 1848) 1.6 3% 79 0.40% 1,733 0.008%
Civil War
(1861 – 1865) 62 104% 3,868 11.10% 184,594 0.538%
Span. Amer. War
(1898) 9.6 3% 307 0.40% 385 0.001%
World War I
(1917 – 1918) 190.6 24% 4,744 4.60% 53,513 0.052%
World War II
(1941 – 1945) 2,896.3 130% 16,354 12.20% 292,131 0.219%
Korea
(1950 – 1953) 335.9 15% 5,764 3.80% 33,651 0.022%
Vietnam
(1964 – 1972) 494.3 12% 8,744 4.30% 47,369 0.023%
First Gulf War
(1990 – 1991) 76.1 1% 2,750 1.10% 148 0.000%
Table 1: American Costs and Casualties from Major Wars. Source: William D. Nordhaus, “The
Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq” in War with Iraq, ed. Kaysen, et. al.
3.5 Example Specifications of the Policymaker’s Best Estimates of Model
Components
This subsection presents the functional forms that we use in our subsequent illustration. These
specifications were chosen to reflect the historical magnitudes described above, and to capture the
intertwined channels through which defense allocations affect both the probability of suffering
an attack and the losses such an attack would impose. The best estimate of the pdf of damage,
conditional on being attacked, is assumed to be the Beta function:
p˜(ψ|χ) =
ψa(χ)−1(1− ψ)b(χ)−1Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ))
, (26)
that for countries that have experienced conflict between 1960-1992 (nearly all of it civil war or terrorism in this
period), the loss in welfare associated with these conflicts is on average equivalent to a permanent 8% drop in
their consumption.
15
where the Gamma function is given by Γ(x) =
∫
∞
0 t
(x−1)e−tdt, z is the maximum amount of
damage an attack can create as a fraction of GDP, and:
a(χ) = 1 +
χ1
χ2
+ θeθχ1 ln (χ1 + χ2)χ1, (27)
b(χ) = 2 +
χ1
χ2
+ eχ2 ln (χ1 + χ2)χ2. (28)
The mean of this pdf is:
E(ψ|χ) =
Γ(1 + a(χ))Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))
Γ(a(χ))Γ(1 + a(χ) + b(χ))
(29)
We set the value of θ = 4 in our calculations.
The best estimate of the probability of suffering an attack is:
P˜w(χ) = 1−
(
β 1
2
(a(χ), b(χ))Γ(a(χ) + b(χ))(χ1 + χ2)
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ))
) 1
5
(30)
where βx(a, b) ≡
∫ x
0 t
a−1(1 − t)b−1dt and a(χ) and b(χ) are defined in (27) and (28). The
term χ1 + χ2 represents the total military expenditure, and reflects its deterrent value. In our
example there is an inverse relationship between the expected damage (conditioned on being
attacked) that corresponds to a particular allocation of defense spending χ and the probability
associated with that allocation, of being attacked in the first place. This can be seen in the
term
β 1
2
(a(χ),b(χ))Γ(a(χ)+b(χ))(χ1+χ2)
Γ(a(χ))Γ(b(χ)) in (30) and represents the probability that damages will be
small—less than half the maximal possible damage—conditioned on attack taking place. Hence,
the higher this number is, the lower the likelihood that an adversary will be tempted to launch
an attack. Finally, we adopt the constant-risk-aversion specification for the utility function
u(c) = c1−γ/(1− γ), where γ > 0.9
3.6 Numerical Results
We focus on a scenario with relatively high values of potential damage in the event of attack,
and choose parameters accordingly. For example, setting the overall size of the defense budget
to equal 10% of total available income, equally divided between χ1 and χ2, implies given the
functional specifications in (26) and (30), that expected losses in the event of attack will amount
to an equivalent loss of 33% of annual consumption, where the probability of an attack taking
place is just under 40%. Doubling the resources devoted to each, leaves the conditional loss equal
to 27% and reduces the probability of attack to just under 30%, and doubling the resources yet
again still leaves an expected loss of nearly 12% conditional on being attacked with an attack
probability of just under 23%. Overall, given the functional specifications in (26) and (30)
9In our calculations we set γ = .98, so utility is close to logarithmic.
16
of the probability of an attack and the damage density as functions of the defense allocation,
policy makers who maximize expected welfare under (26) and (30) will devote just under 0.0842
of available resources to defense, with slightly more than half that, (χ1=0.0465), allocated to
RMA-type expenditure and the remainder, (χ2=0.0376), to traditional military spending. Yet
what is important to emphasise is that these probabilities of attack and damage density functions
are merely best estimates, and the allocation that maximises expected utility is not robust to
any degree of model uncertainty.
In Figure 3 we demonstrate, for alternative levels of the lowest acceptable expected utility
Rc, expressed in consumption losses equivalent units qc=0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.2, the allocations
χ1 and χ2 that attain maximum robustness to model uncertainty at the values α̂=0.179, 0.392,
0.660 and 1.071, respectively. The contours in each frame represent the trade-offs between χ1
and χ2 for the fixed value of qc of that frame and a degree of robustness α̂ marked next to the
contour.
Consider the first panel in Figure 3 which corresponds to the consumption equivalent loss
of qc=.05. Calculating the value of α̂ for different combinations of χ1 and χ2 in (21) and (22)
yields the contours, each one corresponding to a different value of α̂ that surround the unique
maximum at α̂=0.179. That maximum is attained at χ1=0.0583 and χ2=0.0661. This means
that a policy maker willing to accept utility equivalent of 5% less consumption compared to that
associated with expected utility maximisation can, by slightly increasing expenditure on RMA-
type weaponry from χ1=0.0465 to χ1=0.0583, but nearly doubling expenditure on traditional
military hardware from χ2=0.0376 to χ2=0.0661, ensure at least 95% of the (consumption
equivalent) expected utility maximizing reward even if the best estimates of both the likelihood
of attack, and the conditional damage are off by as much as 17.9%.
The remaining three panels in Figure 3 further demonstrate the trade-offs between how much
a policy maker is prepared to accept a lower level of utility (and hence higher values of qc), and
the maximum degrees of robustness to model uncertainty that this sacrifice affords. Thus by
setting qc=0.1, the degree of maximum robustness rises to 39.2%, achieved by setting χ1=0.0717
and χ2=0.1026; setting qc=0.15, the degree of maximum robustness rises to 66.0%, achieved by
setting χ1=0.0882 and χ2=0.1496; and setting qc=0.2, the degree of maximum robustness rises
to 107.1%, achieved by setting χ1=0.114 and χ2=0.2209. In each case higher robustness is
achieved by allocating more resources to defense spending. This is hardly surprising. What
is being chosen here are allocations of defense expenditure designed to insure against model
misspecification that is too optimistic. Yet the increases are asymmetric—relatively little of
the additional expenditure is allocated to the new RMA-type weaponry. Instead higher levels
of robustness are mostly achieved by sharply increasing the investment in the more traditional
weaponry.
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Figure 3: Contour plots for different combinations of χ1 and χ2. The contours represent different
values of α̂ where minimum value of acceptable expected utility is equivalent to a loss of 5%,
10%, 15% or 20% relative to maximised expected utility.
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Why should the share of resources devoted to traditional war fighting capacity rise so much
faster than RMA-type expenditures as the desired degree of robustness to model uncertainty
increases? The reason is that while increasing both types of security expenditure may generate
higher levels of deterrence and also lower the amount of damage suffered in the event of an attack,
it is the acquisition of planes, tanks and artillery, rather than high precision weaponry and
enhanced intelligence gathering that works best in lowering the likelihood of extreme damage.
This pattern can be seen in Figure 4 which traces the the combinations of χ1 and χ2 that yield
maximum values of robustness and the contours reflect the losses in actual expected utility in
consumption terms q˜.
Table 2 summarises the results in Figure 3. It emphasises the relationship that exists between
maximum robustness, α̂ and the acceptable level of losses qc, and how they are achieved by
different combinations of the two types of expenditure. The last column in Table 2 lists the
values of q˜ that express how much in consumption terms we actually expect to relinquish (rather
than qc which represents how much we are prepared to relinquish) relative to expected utility
maximisation under the best estimates P˜w and p˜. That is, while the maximum loss of expected
utility will be less than qc for all eventualities in a α̂ surrounding of P˜w and p˜ corresponding to
any particular row in Table 2, the expected loss of utility relative to maximised expected utility
is only q˜.
What is important to emphasise is that whereas the manner in which an expected utility
maximiser allocates expenditure pays little attention to the perceived low probability events
associated with extreme losses, a robust satisficer, wary of relying too heavily on the probabilities
themselves, will behave in a way that both favours higher expenditure, with the lion’s share of
additional resource devoted to the type of spending that is less susceptible to catastrophic failure.
This illustrates how the search for robustness alters decision making when the trade-offs satisfy
(7) and (8).
To better understand the implicit tradeoff between robustness and minimum acceptable levels
of utility, we plot in Figure 5 the implicit relationship between α̂ and q˜ for combinations of χ1 and
χ2 between 0 and 0.25 (in increments of 0.01). Each curve represents a particular combination
of defense expenditure (χ1, χ2) and traces the implicit relationships in (21) and (22) between
different values of α̂ and q˜ (with the aid of the loss function (25)). Each curve corresponds to a
particular defense allocation, and begins on the horizontal axis where α̂=0 and the welfare loss q˜
is the one implied by the deviation of that allocation from χ∗. As we consider larger deviations
from the best guess uncertainty model, (i.e. increase α̂), that particular allocation yields larger
welfare losses, and hence the curves are upward sloping. The upper contours of all the grey
lines generate the envelope that defines the relationship between maximum robustness α̂ and q˜,
starting at the origin which corresponds to the policy that generates maximum expected utility
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Figure 4: Contour plots for different combinations of χ1 and χ2. The contours represent different
values of q˜, the consumption equivalent expected loss in utility relative to maximised expected
utility. The solid thick curve represents all the combinations of χ1 and χ2 attaining maximum
robustness α̂ to model misspecification.
and zero robustness.
Policy makers first determine the minimum level of acceptable utility, denominated here
as consumption equivalent deviations from maximum expected utility, and this determines the
maximum degree of attainable robustness to model error. A given combination of defense
expenditure (χ1, χ2) delivers a monotonic relationship between the value of qc and α̂ in Figure
4, which together generate an envelope that defines the convex relationship between qc and
α̂ (the red curves correspond to the particular values of χ1 and χ2 that generate maximum
robustness for the values qc = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2). The cost of achieving an additional increment
of robustness to model uncertainty and immunity to catastrophic failure declines as policy
makers permit greater deviations from policies that maximize expected utility. The more policy
makers are cognizant of the limitations of the information they possess, in terms of efficacy
of the measures they have at their disposal to both deter and repel aggression, the more we
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qc χ1 χ2 αˆ q˜
0 0.0465 0.0376 0 0
0.05 0.0583 0.0661 0.1794 0.0053
0.1 0.0717 0.1026 0.3919 0.0228
0.15 0.0882 0.1496 0.6601 0.0569
0.2 0.1140 0.2209 1.0712 0.1283
Table 2: The combinations of χ1 and χ2 that generate maximum robustness α̂, for different
levels of maximally acceptable consumption equivalent losses compared to expected utility max-
imization, qc, and the implied loss in expected utility (in consumption equivalents) of these
defense allocations q˜.
should expect them to reach for solutions that achieve robustness through both greater military
expenditure and heavier reliance on the type of expenditure that is most effective at preventing
catastrophic losses.
3.7 Discussion
How do we quantify security threats and the losses they may generate, and what are the differ-
ent possible security expenditures that are meant to counter them? Fragmentary anecdotal and
quantitative evidence exists concerning the impact of military expenditures on the probability
distribution of war-related damage. Rohlfs (2006) estimates that the marginal effectiveness of a
U.S. tank in Western Europe for 164 battles during World War II was twenty-four times the ef-
fectiveness of a single infantryman but eighty-seven times as expensive to use. The discrepancy
is explained by the higher casualties associated with intensive use of infantry, implying that
the U.S. government assigned a value of approximately one million dollars (in 2003 dollars) to
each soldier’s life saved on the battlefield. Although Rohlfs’ study involves calculating ex-post
a relatively simple trade-off in a single theater of a war in its fifth and sixth year (1944-1945),
his estimates contain relatively large standard errors and vary across different sub-samples. By
contrast, policy makers must determine ex-ante both the overall effectiveness of defense expen-
ditures and their optimal allocations, at a stage when the nature, scale, and even eventuality of
a conflict may be only hypothetical. In the years prior to being attacked in 1941, the U.S.S.R.
engaged in a massive rearmament program that, according to Bergson (1961), lowered per-capita
consumption between 1937 and 1940 by as much as 8.4%. However, not only did rearmament
fail to deter Hitler’s invasion as the Soviets had hoped, but because of serious military miscal-
culations, much of the arms and manpower was squandered during the summer and fall of 1941
without seriously slowing the German advance (Harrison, 1985).
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attainable robustness αˆ to model misspecification.
Often enough, the pursuit of policies designed to limit casualties but not be robust to mis-
specification can result in complete catastrophe. Soon after the end of World War I the French
government and military immediately began a debate on the best way to prepare for renewed
conflict with Germany. One doctrine relied heavily on a smaller professional army well-trained
in offense, and capable of mastering the new techniques of maneuver. The alternative that
was eventually adopted, relied on a larger force of conscripts backed by reservists to defend
France’s borders along a static heavily fortified front. On 30 September 1927, the Commission
d’Organization des Re´gion Fortifie´es, (CORF) was established to plan construction of a line
of fortifications along France’s western frontiers with Italy, Germany, portions of southern and
central Belgium as well as Corsica, that ultimately came to bear the name of the Minister of
War and decorated veteran of Verdun, Andre´ Maginot. The Maginot line was meant to protect
France from a possible German invasion once France had completed the planned evacuation of
its forces from the Rhineland in 1935. The line was based on a series of concrete multi-storied
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casements and ouvrages (fortresses). The smallest housed a squad of thirty men manning twin
7.5mm machine guns and 37 or 47mm anti-tank guns. The largest the gros ouvrages were large
complex structures, built mostly underground, housing garrisons of 500-1,000 men and fired
heavy artillery from turrets set in the ground. Each was surrounded by their own series of
machine gun turrets for protection.
The Maginot line’s appeal was its promise to both deter a German attack and in the event
deterrence failed, to minimize French casualties by replacing ‘a wall of chests’ with ‘a wall of
concrete’. Between 1930 and the time most of it had been completed in 1935, its construction
alone consumed between one-half and one percent of French output each year, at a time when
total French expenditure on defense averaged 4.7% of GDP. 10 Two important gaps remained
along the border with Belgium, near the sea the high water table precluded the building of
subterranean forts, and in the Ardennes where Marshal Pe´tain, inspector general of the army
until 1931, had asserted the terrain was impassible to German armour.11
During the six week German assault on France between 10 May 1940 and the signing of the
armistice on 22 June, nearly every fort along the Maginot line performed as it was designed—they
deterred direct attacks along the Franco-German border, and most successfully repulsed those
efforts made by the Germans to attack them from the east. Ultimately however, Pe´tain’s assur-
ances not withstanding, the Germans did move their armour through the Ardennes, outflanking
the Maginot line and forcing French capitulation. French strategic doctrine, designed to operate
under one set of conditions, was not robust to the unexpected, and ultimately failed in a catas-
trophic manner. A doctrine that might have proven more robust to catastrophic failure—that
advocated by General Charles De Gaulle (but successfully implemented by Wehrmacht General
Heinz Guderian) of armoured forces able to move quickly to attack and fight independently of
the infantry—was rejected, in part because it implied the likelihood of higher casualties.12
In our interpretation, investment in the Maginot line was then akin to choosing high values
of χ1 (RMA in our more modern example). Had the Germans not found a way to circumvent
it, it might have repelled the invasion, and then done so as designed—at the cost of relatively
few casualties. Instead it failed catastrophically—French planning was not sufficiently robust.
10W. J. Thies, “Alliances and Collective Goods,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1987; 31: 298-332.
11J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann, The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass, Praeger Security International,
Westport CT, 1997.
12J.E. Kaufmann and H.W. Kaufmann, Fortress France: The Maginot Line and French Defenses in World War
II, Praeger Security International, Westport CT, 2006.
23
4 Conclusion
Our application of the information gap approach to the problem of allocating resources for
national security yields three broad conclusions, each of which is evaluated quantitatively. First,
the higher the robustness to model misspecification policy makers demand, the higher the overall
level of defense expenditures required. Second, the greater the demand for robustness, the
greater should be the reliance on those defense measures better suited to prevent extremely
high levels of damage. Similarly, the more robustness policy makers wish to achieve, the more
they should eschew investment in systems that promise the best expected outcomes on the
battlefield, but are also more vulnerable to catastrophical damage when they fail.
Beyond the normative recommendations for how policy makers can best allocate resources
to protect their countries from aggression, in a world in which much of the relevant information
is unreliable, the model also provides some positive insights into the reasons for the policies
policy makers choose today or have chosen in the past. In a world with unreliable probabilistic
information, we should not be surprised if policy makers lavish higher expenditure on defense
than would be appropriate if the only goal were expected utility maximization. Furthermore, we
would expect policy makers to favor expenditures on weapons systems, and associated tactics
and strategies, that are both most effective in preventing worst-case scenarios and are also
better understood. These would suggest one possible rationale for military planners’ reputation
for conservatism, and indeed inertia, when confronted with new and untried technologies and
doctrines.
A century before Frank Knight made the distinction between risk and uncertainty, Von
Clausewitz noted the problems associated with the unreliability of information in military set-
tings.
Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are
uncertain .... One report tallies with another, confirms it, magnifies it, lends it color,
till [the officer] has to make a quick decision which is soon recognized to be mistaken,
just as the reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors, and so on. In short,
most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and inaccuracies
....13 The general unreliability of all information presents a special problem in war:
all action takes place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which like fog or moonlight,
often tends to make things seem grotesque and larger than they really are.14
The information gap approach does nothing to ameliorate the unreliability of information, but
13Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Everyman’s Library, London, 1993),
136.
14Ibid.,161.
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it does offer policy makers a methodology to make decisions better suited for such environments.
5 Appendix-Derivation of the Robustness Function
We derive the robustness function in (21) for values of the robustness not in excess of unity:
α̂ ≤ 1. We make no assumptions about the utility function u(c) other than that the marginal
utility is positive: u′(c) > 0.
The main task is to find the pdf of the damage, p(ψ|χ) which, at horizon of uncertainty
α, minimizes the expected utility R(χ|p, Pw) defined in (1). Because the marginal utility is
positive it is evident that R(χ|p, Pw) is minimized by that pdf in F(α, p˜, P˜w) which assigns as
much weight as possible at large levels of damage and as little weight as possible at low levels
of damage. For the fractional-error info-gap model in (9) one readily shows that min
α
R(χ|p, Pw)
occurs with the following pdf:
p(ψ|χ) =
 (1− α)p˜(ψ|χ) if ψ ≤ ψm(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (31)
where ψm is the median of the estimated pdf p˜(ψ|χ) and where α ≤ 1.
If α > 1 then min
α
R(χ|p, Pw) occurs with the following pdf:
p(ψ|χ) =
 0 if ψ ≤ ψs(1 + α)p˜(ψ|χ) else (32)
where ψs satisfies:
(1 + α)
∫ 1
ψs
p˜(ψ|χ) dψ = 1 (33)
In other words, ψs is the 1− 1/(1 + α) quantile of p˜(ψ|χ).
Consider first the case α<1.
The utility R(χ|p, Pw) in (1), evaluated with the pdf in (31), is:
R(χ|p, Pw) = (r˜ − δrα− u(c))Pw + u(c) (34)
where r˜ and δr are defined in (10) and (19) and u(c) is the utility if an attack does not occur.
The term r˜ − δrα− u(c) is negative so the minimizing value of Pw in F(α, p˜, P˜w) is (1 + α)P˜w.
Thus the minimum expected utility, up to horizon of uncertainty α, is:
min
p,Pw∈F (α,p˜,P˜w)
R(χ|p, Pw) = (r˜ − δrα− u(c)) (1 + α)P˜w + u(c) (35)
Given that marginal utility is positive, r˜1 > r˜2, and therefore δr > 0. This, together with the
assumption r˜(χ) < u(c), implies that r˜ − u(c) − δr < 0. Denote the minimum value in (35) as
Rc and solve the quadratic function in α for the positive root (21).
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For instances where α ≥ 1:
min
p,Pw∈F (α,p˜,P˜w)
R(χ|p, Pw) = ((1 + α)s˜2 − u(c)) (1 + α)P˜w + u(c) (36)
and following the same procedure yields the solution for the positive root α in (22).
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